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OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Acting on an arrest warrant, police arrested Shamone
Kennedy and impounded a nearby rental car that Kennedy‟s
girlfriend had lent him a few days earlier. Following an
inventory search, police found two guns and 200 grams of
cocaine inside the car. Kennedy moved to suppress the
evidence found in the car, contending he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in its contents. The District Court
denied the motion. Because we find that the driver of a rental
car whose name is not listed on the rental agreement
generally lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car,
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we conclude that Kennedy‟s suppression motion was properly
denied. Accordingly, we will affirm.
I.
A.
Following the arrest of two minors in connection with
stolen firearms, Detective Quinn of the Coatesville City
Police Department received information indicating that some
of those firearms had been sold for money and drugs at a
home on First Avenue to a man known as “Tex” and later
identified as defendant Kennedy.
Police subsequently
obtained a warrant and searched the home on First Avenue,
where they found guns, drugs, and personal effects belonging
to Kennedy. A federal warrant was issued for Kennedy‟s
arrest on January 18, 2006.
Six days earlier, on January 12, 2006, Kennedy‟s
girlfriend Courtney Fields had rented a silver Toyota Camry
from Kulp Car Rental and given the key to Kennedy, who
used the car until January 18, 2006. Kennedy‟s name was not
listed on the rental agreement.
On January 18, a police informant who knew Kennedy
notified Detective Chris McEvoy that earlier in the day he
had seen Kennedy driving a silver Toyota Camry, the car
Fields had rented, on Chestnut Street between 7th and 8th
Streets. McEvoy then passed this information on to the day
and evening shifts of the Coatesville Police Department.
Later that evening, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Officer John
Regan, Corporal Sean Knapp, and Sergeant Martin Brice
encountered Kennedy—wearing black gloves and carrying in
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his right hand a rental key inscribed with the Kulp Car Rental
insignia and listing the car it belonged to as a silver Toyota
Camry—walking diagonally across Chester Avenue and
down the hill toward East Lincoln Highway. The officers
placed Kennedy under arrest pursuant to the warrant. They
then searched Kennedy and found on his person $2,692 in
United States currency, a set of keys, and four cell phones.
The District Court later determined that Kennedy was a
validly licensed driver.
After Kennedy was taken to the police station, Officer
Regan asked him where he lived. Kennedy said he lived at
714 East Lincoln Highway, a house less than a block from the
location of the arrest. Officer Regan went to that location and
soon found a silver Camry on Chester Street with a Kulp Car
Rental bracket around its license plate. In the meantime,
Sergeant Brice spoke with Kulp Car Rental‟s owner, who
requested that the police tow the car to the police station.
While Officer Regan waited for a tow truck, three people
approached the car from East Lincoln Highway, at which
time Officer Regan instructed them to move away from the
vehicle. The man and two women continued up the street to a
house where they watched Officer Regan and the car from the
front porch and window. One of the three was Courtney
Fields, Kennedy‟s girlfriend and the person who had rented
the car and given Kennedy the key.
Following the car‟s impoundment, Detective Martin
Quinn directed Corporal Scott Neuhaus to conduct an
inventory search of the car pursuant to Department policy so
that the vehicle could then be picked up by someone from
Kulp. Corporal Neuhaus began the inventory search with the
trunk, where he found a partially opened duffle bag
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containing a disassembled rifle in three pieces.
He
immediately stopped the search and spoke with Detective
Quinn, who then sought a search warrant for the entire
vehicle. That same day, at her request, Fields‟s attorney
informed the police that there could be drugs in the car.
On January 20, 2006, Detective McEvoy and Detective
Sean Murrin received a federal search warrant for the vehicle.
Inside, the detectives found a cell phone charger plugged into
the dashboard cigarette lighter, and a second cell phone
charger in the passenger compartment, each of which fit one
of the four phones found on Kennedy at the time of arrest.
The detectives then opened the locked glove compartment
and found a semi-automatic handgun, a magazine containing
around 30 rounds of ammunition, and a plastic bag containing
smaller bags with an off-white chunky substance later
confirmed to be 202 grams of cocaine base.
B.
On August 30, 2006, a grand jury indicted Kennedy on
two counts of possession of 50 grams or more of cocaine base
(“crack”) with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1); two counts of possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c); and two counts of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). One count of
each crime related to the evidence obtained at the First
Avenue address and one count of each crime to the evidence
obtained from the silver Camry. Kennedy filed a motion to
suppress both the evidence obtained from the home on First
Avenue and the evidence obtained from the Camry.
Following a hearing, the District Court issued a written
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opinion denying the motion. See United States v. Kennedy,
No. 06-23, 2007 WL 1740747 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2007).
As to the search of the home on First Avenue, the
District Court held both that Kennedy lacked standing to
contest the search because he had not shown any connection
to the house, and that the search was proper because there
was a substantial basis for the magistrate judge‟s
determination that there was probable cause to support the
issuance of a warrant. Id. at *2-3.
As to the searches of the silver Camry, the District
Court acknowledged that the Third Circuit had not yet
directly addressed the question of whether an individual who
borrows a rental car but is not an authorized driver under the
rental agreement has standing to challenge a search of the
rental car. The District Court cited United States v. Baker,
221 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2000), for the proposition that to
“determin[e] whether someone who borrowed a car had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in it,” a court must conduct
a “„fact-bound‟ inquiry assessing „the strength of the driver‟s
interest in the car and the nature of his control over it‟”
Kennedy, 2007 WL 1740747 at *4 (quoting Baker, 221 F.3d
at 442).
Relying on Baker, the District Court found that
because Kennedy had Fields‟s permission to use the car, a
driver‟s license, and was in fact driving the car on January 18,
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. Id.
Nevertheless, the District Court found that under the
circumstances, including the absence of an authorized driver
to remove the car from the street, it was reasonable for the
police to honor the rental company‟s request and impound the
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car. Under settled law, the impoundment made it permissible
to conduct an inventory search of the car‟s contents. Id. at
*4-5.
Accordingly, in light of what it found to be
constitutionally valid procedures, the District Court denied
Kennedy‟s Motion to Suppress in its entirety.
After three days of trial, the District Court declared a
mistrial when the jury could not reach a verdict. Kennedy
was retried on only one count each of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), all relating to
the evidence found in the car. After a two-day trial, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on those three remaining counts.
The District Court then sentenced Kennedy to a term of
imprisonment of 300 months followed by a 10 year period of
supervised release. This timely appeal followed.
II.
A.
We “review the district court‟s denial of [a] motion to
suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise
plenary review as to its legality in light of the court‟s properly
found facts.” United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 999 (3d
Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505,
509 (3d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he proponent of a motion to suppress bears the burden of
proving not only that the search . . . was illegal, but also that
he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in [the place
searched].” United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d
Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted) (second set of
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brackets in original).1
B.
As previously stated, the District Court found that
because Kennedy had Fields‟s permission to use the car she
rented, Kennedy had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
its contents. The Government argues that we should reverse
the District Court‟s holding that Kennedy had standing to
challenge the search of his car in the first instance. Although
the right to challenge a search on Fourth Amendment grounds
is generally referred to as “standing,” the Supreme Court has
clarified that the definition of that right “is more properly
placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment
law than within that of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 140 (1978). Accordingly, standing to challenge a search
is not a threshold issue that must be decided before reaching
the question of whether a search was or was not
constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Varlack Ventures,
Inc., 149 F.3d 212, 215-16 (3d Cir. 1998) (assuming, without
deciding, that appellant had standing to challenge search but
nevertheless reversing district court‟s suppression of
evidence). The Court may therefore affirm the district court
on any ground supported by the record, whether because
Kennedy lacked standing to challenge the search, or because
the officers‟ search did not run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment. E.g., United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161,
168 (3d Cir. 2005).
1

We have jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, pursuant to Kennedy‟s timely filing of a notice of
appeal from the order of judgment entered on April 1, 2009.
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Fourth Amendment standing “requires that the
individual challenging the search have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the property searched . . . and that
he manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the
property searched[.]” United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d at 441
(citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 39 (1988)). With regard to the objective prong of
this test, which is at issue here, a reasonable or legitimate
expectation of privacy must have “a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.” Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12);
see also, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338
(2000) (“Our Fourth Amendment analysis . . . . inquire[s]
whether the individual‟s expectation of privacy is one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”) (internal
quotation and citation omitted); Carter, 525 U.S. at 101
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The application of [the
standing] rule involves consideration of the kind of place in
which the individual claims the privacy interest and what
expectations of privacy are traditional and well recognized.”).
While “[e]xpectations of privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment . . . need not be based on a common-law
interest in real or personal property, . . . by focusing on
legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of
property concepts in determining the presence or absence of
the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.” Rakas,
439 U.S. at 143 n.12. Therefore, “one who owns or lawfully
possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his] right to
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exclude.” Id.; see also United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d
1248, 1256-57 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Recent cases . . . reflect the
Supreme Court‟s continued consideration of property
interests in determining Fourth Amendment privacy
interests.”) With these considerations in mind, we turn to the
record before us.
C.
The District Court relied on our decision in United
States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2000), in reaching its
conclusion that Kennedy had standing to challenge the search
of the car. In Baker, the defendant was arrested for driving a
car to his parole office, because driving was an express
violation of his parole conditions. The parole officers
searched the car, which was registered in someone else‟s
name, and discovered drug paraphernalia. The officers then
conducted a warrantless search of Baker‟s home, in which
they found weapons and heroin. 221 F.3d at 440-41.
Although testimony that Baker‟s friend owned and had lent
him the car conflicted with the identity of the owner of the car
as listed in its title and registration, for purposes of the
standing analysis we assumed that the defendant had
“borrowed it from a friend and had been driving it for four to
six weeks.” Id. at 442.
In determining whether Baker had standing, we stated
that “whether the driver of a car has the reasonable
expectation of privacy necessary to show Fourth Amendment
standing is a fact-bound question dependent on the strength of
his interest in the car and the nature of his control over it[.]”
Id. at 442 (collecting cases). Because he had been lent the car
by a friend, “had been driving it for four to six weeks[,]” and
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had “carried the keys to the car with him into the parole
office[,]” we concluded that “Baker had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the car.” Id. at 442-43. Baker thus
stands for the proposition that, in conducting the “fact-bound”
inquiry into whether a driver has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in a car, a person who lawfully borrows a car from
another and exercises substantial control over it may well
have a legitimate expectation of privacy. This, however, does
not speak to the distinct factual scenario presented here:
whether someone who has been given permission to drive a
vehicle by its renter, without the knowledge of its owner and
in contravention of the rental agreement, nevertheless has
standing to challenge a search of that vehicle. Accordingly,
we disagree with Kennedy that Baker augurs in favor of any
particular outcome here.
Instead, recognizing that the inquiry must remain
“fact-bound,” we concur with the majority of circuits that
have considered this factual scenario and conclude that, as a
general rule, the driver of a rental car who has been lent the
car by the renter, but who is not listed on the rental agreement
as an authorized driver, lacks a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the car unless there exist extraordinary
circumstances suggesting an expectation of privacy. See, e.g.,
United States v. Seeley, 331 F.3d 471, 472 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003)
(per curiam) (finding that driver of rental car lacked standing
where he was not the renter or authorized driver); United
States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding
that unauthorized driver of rental car who had been given
permission to drive by co-defendant, an authorized driver,
lacked standing); United States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 88788 (10th Cir. 1990) (defendant lacked standing where car he
was driving was rented by co-defendant‟s common law wife
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and he was not listed as additional driver in rental contract);
cf. United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001)
(noting that “as a general rule, an unauthorized driver of a
rental vehicle does not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the vehicle” but nevertheless finding that the
defendant had standing in light of the “truly unique” facts of
that case).
Unlike the defendant in Baker, an individual who
borrows a rental car without the permission or knowledge of
the owner not only acts in contravention of the owner‟s
property rights, but also deceives the owner of the vehicle
while increasing the risk that the property will be harmed or
lost. Although property law is not controlling, neither is it
irrelevant. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (“Legitimation of
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of
real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.”). An authorized driver
on the rental agreement has lawful possession of the vehicle
and, within the scope of the rental agreement, may
legitimately exclude others from using it. See, e.g., United
States v. Walker, 237 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A
person listed as an approved driver on a rental agreement has
an objective expectation of privacy in the vehicle due to his
possessory and property interest in the vehicle.”). In contrast,
an unauthorized driver has no cognizable property interest in
the rental vehicle and therefore no accompanying right to
exclude. The lack of such an interest supports the position
that it is objectively unreasonable for an unauthorized driver
to expect privacy in the vehicle. See Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that
“[n]ot every concept of ownership or possession is „arcane‟”
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and “„the right to exclude‟ is an essential element of modern
property rights” that “often may be a principal determinant in
the establishment of a legitimate Fourth Amendment
interest”). Accordingly, we agree with the majority of
circuits which have considered this scenario and find that
such circumstances will normally take one outside the wellrecognized and shared understandings of privacy in our
society.
Kennedy urges us instead to follow the decisions of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have held that an
unauthorized driver of a rental car has standing where the
renter gives him permission to use the vehicle. See United
States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, for the proposition that the
unauthorized driver of a rental car has standing where given
permission by the authorized driver, because “arcane
distinctions developed in property . . . law . . . ought not . . .
control” the standing inquiry); United States v. Best, 135 F.3d
1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that if the unauthorized
driver had permission from the renter, the driver “would have
a privacy interest giving rise to standing”); United States v.
Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(unauthorized driver who presented no evidence that renter
had given him permission to use rental car lacked standing,
although evidence of “consensual possession” would have
established standing).
The Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Thomas, which
contains the most extensive reasoning among these decisions,
deserves particular attention. In Thomas, a known associate
of the defendant rented a car, listed only himself as an
authorized driver, and then lent the car to Thomas. 447 F.3d
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at 1194-95. In light of these facts, the Government argued
that Thomas lacked standing to challenge the search of the car
because “a driver has no legal right to control or to possess a
rental car in contravention of the lease agreement.” Id. at
1198. The Court rejected this argument, noting that even
where “an unauthorized driver may be in violation of the
rental agreement, we have previously held that a privacy
interest exists even if a defendant is in technical violation of a
leasing contract.” Id. To support this assertion, it cited to
cases in which courts held that a lessee of an automobile or
motel room maintains his or her privacy interest in the
property even where the lessee maintains possession of the
property after the agreement has expired. See id. (citing
United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 647 (9th Cir.
2000), as amended Mar. 5, 2001 (lessee of rental car has
reasonable expectation of privacy even after expiration of
agreement, as long as he maintains possession and control of
the car); United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th
Cir. 2001) (expiration of motel room rental period, in absence
of affirmative acts by lessor to repossess, does not
automatically terminate lessee‟s expectation of privacy);
United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398-1402 (11th Cir.
1998) (renter has reasonable expectation of privacy even after
rental car lease has expired); United States v. Owens, 782
F.2d 146, 150 (10th Cir. 1986) (motel guest maintains a
reasonable expectation of privacy in motel room even after
check-out time)).
From the holdings of these cases, as well as the
Supreme Court‟s admonition that “„arcane distinctions
developed in property and tort law . . . ought not . . . control‟
the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy,” Thomas,
447 F.3d at 1199 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143), the Ninth
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Circuit determined that “an unauthorized driver who received
permission to use a rental car and has joint authority over the
car may challenge the search to the same extent as the
authorized renter.” Id.
We do not, however, find the analysis in Thomas
persuasive. The Ninth Circuit reasons that a lessee‟s
“technical” violation of a lease agreement by untimely
returning the leased property is substantially analogous to a
violation of a lease agreement by lending that property to a
third party who is not discussed in the lease. Hence, it
concludes that the two types of breach should be treated the
same for purposes of determining whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy. The persuasiveness of the
analogy breaks down, however, when one considers the
different risks that each type of breach creates for the
property owner, the different precautions that owners take to
protect against each breach, and the corresponding
differences with which society is likely to view those
breaches.
The risk of additional harm to or loss of leased
property is likely to be small and easily quantifiable where
the lessee merely maintains possession of the property past
the expiration of the lease agreement. Indeed, because
normally the expected loss will merely increase in proportion
to the amount of time that the property is being used, the
owner can easily seek compensation for this breach of the
lease by charging an additional pro rata fee based on the
amount of additional time that the property is used. See
Darren M. Goldman, Note, Resolving a Three-Way Circuit
Split: Why Unauthorized Rental Drivers Should Be Denied
Fourth Amendment Standing, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 1687, 1722 &
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n.285 (2009) (citing to actual rental car contracts that
“account for tardiness and build in penalty fees should a
driver return the car late”).
However, the risk of loss or harm is likely to be quite
difficult to quantify, or even estimate, where an unknown and
unauthorized individual uses the leased property. In the
rental car context, car rental agencies will normally require
renters to provide information about all authorized drivers,
such as their ages, whether they have valid driver‟s licenses,
and access to their driving records. Of course, there are no
means for agencies to obtain this information for
unauthorized drivers. They will therefore face significantly
higher risks because of the possibility that an unauthorized
driver does not have a license, is a young and inexperienced
driver, or has a history of accidents or criminal activity.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit‟s reliance, in Thomas, on
cases where the lessee of a motel room or apartment
maintained his expectation of privacy even after the
agreement had expired, is inapposite. We have previously
noted, as has the Supreme Court, that an individual generally
has a greater expectation of privacy in his home or “living
quarters” than he does in an automobile. See United States v.
Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that “the
Fourth Amendment has been repeatedly characterized by the
Supreme Court as affording enhanced protection to the home,
and diminished protection to vehicles.”) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). Accordingly, while the expectations
of privacy of one who rents an apartment or motel room may
survive the termination of the lease under certain
circumstances, this does not mean that expectations of
privacy will necessarily extend beyond the termination of a
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rental car agreement.
In light of these considerations, we believe that society
views authorized drivers who return rental cars a few hours
late quite differently from unauthorized drivers who borrow
rental cars without the rental company‟s knowledge or
permission. While the former is a largely harmless and even
expected occurrence that can be easily managed by the
owner, the latter is a deceptive means of placing unbargainedfor risk of property harm and loss onto the rental company.
Because we find the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit‟s contrary
rule in Thomas unpersuasive, we join the majority of circuits
in concluding that the lack of a cognizable property interest in
the rental vehicle and the accompanying right to exclude
makes it generally unreasonable for an unauthorized driver to
expect privacy in the vehicle. We therefore hold that society
generally does not share or recognize an expectation of
privacy for those who have gained possession and control
over a rental vehicle they have borrowed without the
permission of the rental company.
We do acknowledge United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d
571 (6th Cir. 2001), as an example of extraordinary
circumstances that might overcome the general rule that we
adopt here. In Smith, the Sixth Circuit upheld an order
suppressing evidence in the case of a defendant who was an
unauthorized driver of the rental car that was searched.
However, the defendant was also the husband of the woman
who had rented the car four days earlier and had himself
“personally contacted the rental car company . . . and reserved
the vehicle in his name, using his own credit card, which was
billed for the rental.” Id. at 582. The Sixth Circuit explained
that the defendant‟s “business relationship with the rental
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company and his intimate relationship with his wife, the
authorized driver of the vehicle, are relationships which are
recognized by law and society[,]” and “[b]ased on these
relationships, as well as the fact that he personally paid for
the vehicle, Smith had both a subjective and an objective
legitimate expectation of privacy.” Id. at 587.
In this case, we discern none of the extraordinary
circumstances present in Smith. Unlike Smith, where the
driver “was the de facto renter of the vehicle,” here Kennedy
“was simply granted permission by the „renter‟ of the
vehicle.” Smith, 263 F.3d at 586-87. Although Kennedy had
the permission of the renter to operate the vehicle, he did not
have the permission of the owner. As examined above, any
expectation of privacy he subjectively held in the vehicle was
therefore objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, we hold
that Kennedy lacks standing to contest the search of the rental
vehicle.
Further, even had Kennedy pointed to such
extraordinary circumstances, we would nevertheless find that
he lacks standing under the particular facts here. Because
Kulp Car Rental, as lawful owner, informed law enforcement
that Kennedy was an unauthorized driver and instructed them
to impound the car until Kulp could recover it, any residual
expectation of privacy that Kennedy might have acquired
would have been effectively terminated by Kulp‟s directive.2

2

Because we hold that Kennedy does not have Fourth
Amendment standing to challenge the search of the rental car,
we do not reach the issue of whether the impoundment of the
car was an unconstitutional seizure.
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III.
Finally, Kennedy challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence based upon which the jury found him guilty.
Because Kennedy did not preserve the issue of sufficiency of
the evidence by raising an objection at the close of the
evidence, we will reverse only if we find plain error. United
States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 654-55 (3d Cir. 2006). “We
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, and will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 657.
Kennedy contends that although the evidence
presented at trial established that he had access to the rental
car and the contraband in it, Fields and possibly unidentified
others also had access to and drove the car on the day of its
seizure. Kennedy also cites to cases both within and outside
the Third Circuit holding that the neither a defendant‟s mere
proximity to contraband nor his mere presence at the property
where contraband is located is sufficient to demonstrate the
“dominion and control” over the contraband that is necessary
to support a finding of actual or constructive possession.
Having conducted a thorough and careful review of the
record, we find that the cases relied on by Kennedy are
inapposite and that the jury could have reasonably credited
Fields‟s testimony that she was neither aware of nor involved
with the contraband in the car. We therefore conclude,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, that a reasonable jury could have found beyond
a reasonable doubt that Kennedy had both knowledge as well
as dominion and control over the drugs and firearms found in
the vehicle.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the District Court.
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